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RECENT DECISIONS
Evidence - Admissibility of Dying Declaration - Lee H. Allen was
convicted in the Ontario County Court for manslaughter in the first
degree, and from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court, affirming the County Court's judgment on the verdict, defendant
appealed. Held: The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that state-
ments by the victim about twelve hours before her death were inadmis-
sible as dying declarations. People v. Allen, 90 N.E. (2d) 48 (1949 New
York).
The principle upon whice dying declarations are received in evi-
dence is that the mind, impressed with the idea of approaching dissolu-
tion, acts under a sanction equally powerful with that which it is pre-
sumed to feel by a solemn appeal to God upon an oath. Safety in re-
ceiving such declarations lies only in the fact that the declarant is so
controlled by a belief that his death is certain and imminent that malice,
hatred, passion, and other feelings of like nature are overwhelmed and
banished by it. The evidence should be clear that the declarations were
made under a sense of impending death without any hope of recovery.'
However, the admissibility of dying declarations does not depend upon
any particular form of expression. There is no unyielding ritual of
words to be spoken by the dying,2 and the fact that the declaration is
made some days or weeks prior to the death of the declarant does not
render it incompetent.3
What is decisive is the state of mind of the declarant. Even so, the
state of mind must be exhibited in evidence and not left to conjecture.
The patient must have spoken with the consciousness of a swift and
certain doom.4 In Shepard v. United States, Mr. Justice Cardozo said,
"Fear or even belief that illness will end in death will not avail
of itself to make a dying declaration. There must be a "settled
hopeless expectation" that death is near at hand, and what is said
must have been spoken in the hush of its impending presence." 5
If the declarant thinks there is a slight chance of living, the declarations
are inadmissible.6
The declarant's certainty that he is about to die and the lack of all
hope of recovery may be proven by his express language or conduct, or
inferred from his physical condition and obvious danger, or acquies-
cence in the opinions of doctors or others stated to him, or other ade-
quate circumstances.7 But, as the guarantee consists in the subjective
"People v. Sarzano, 212 N.Y. 231, 106 N.E. 87 (1914).
2 People v. Bartelini, 285 N.Y. 433, 35 N.E. (2d) 29 (1941).
3 State v. Elias, 205 Minn., 156, 285 N.W. 475 (1939).
4 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933).5 Supra, Note 4.
6 Ibid.
7 State v. Sanford, 44 N.M. 66, 97 P. (2d) 915 (1939).
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effect of the approach of death, the declarant should appear to have had
a consciousness of the approach of death; and this consciousness must
of course exist at the time of making the declaration.s
Thus if a declarant believes and exhibits the belief that his death is
imminent and because of this belief makes a statement naming his
assailant, the declaration should be admissible as a dying declaration.
However, the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case are ap-
plied to the rule and if the rule is satisfied then the statement is ad-
missible. In the instant case, the declarant, Mrs. Allen received the last
rites of her church shortly after arriving at the hospital, suffering from
an abdominal wound inflicted by a bread knife. She made repeated
statements to various people that she thought she was going to die,
and during the 5 days she lived, she never once expressed any belief
or hope of recovery. There was no evidence to indicate that Mrs. Allen
thought her death was imminent or that she made her statement be-
cause of the fear of imminent death. The declaration in dispute was
made to the declarant's mother about twelve hours before death in
narrative fashion recounting the events of the stabbing.
It is the opinion of the writer that the Court of Appeals was correct
in holding the declaration inadmissible because, applying the rule to
the facts in the instant case, it is clear that the declarant, Mrs. Allen,
did not speak under a sense of impending death and as a result of the
sense of impending death. Therefore since the rule was not satisfied
the Court of Appeals in the instant case could only reverse the judg-
ment, assuming the settled rules as to dying declarations may not be
broadened except by statute.9
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Labor Law - Evidence Necessary to Sustain Allegation of Discrimina-
tory Discharge - Complainant union brought this action against re-
spondent employer alleging that respondent was committing unfair
labor practices in violation of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act.,
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board found the following
facts: respondent in its wholesale hardware business maintained a large
warehouse in the city of Madison, Wisconsin; merchandise was shipped
s People v. Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 109 N.E. 127 (1915).
9Sowell v. State, 30 Ala. App. 18, 199 So. 900 (1941).
'Section 111.06(1) provides "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer individually or in concert with others: (a) To interfere with, restrain
or coerce his employes in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
111.94 . . . (c) 1. To encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization, employe agency, committee, association or representation plan
by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure or other terms or conditions
of employment; provided, that an employer shall not be prohibited from
entering into an all-union agreement with the representatives of his employes
in a collective bargaining unit, . . ." Section 111.04 guarantees to employes
freedom in joining or refusing to join unions. Wis. Stat. (1949), Chap. 111.
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